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Trade openness can reduce inflation volatility through limiting recourse to 
seigniorage during periods of temporary fiscal deficits, and by shifting consumption 
and production towards goods for which the terms of trade are relatively stable. This 
paper provides evidence for a negative effect of openness on inflation volatility using 
a dynamic panel model that controls for the endogeneity of openness and the effects 
of both average inflation and the exchange rate regime. The relationship is found to 
be strongest amongst developing and emerging market economies. We show that 
openness reduces the volatility of reserve money growth and terms of trade growth 
and that these effects contribute to the relationship between openness and inflation 
volatility. 
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A striking feature of recent global macroeconomic performance has been the substantial decline
in in￿ ation volatility. In the United States in￿ ation volatility has fallen by two thirds since
the mid-1980s and similar trends have been observed in other OECD countries (Blanchard and
Simon 2001). Even developing countries, which continue to experience higher and more volatile
in￿ ation than the industrial countries, have seen in￿ ation volatility fall since the early 1990s.
The decline in in￿ ation volatility comes at a time of increasing international trade. This paper
asks whether or not in￿ ation volatility is related to trade openness - can the greater in￿ ation
stability of the 1990s be described, in the parlance of Rogo⁄(2003), as a further ￿ unsung bene￿t
of globalization￿?
We propose two mechanisms through which openness may restrict in￿ ation volatility. The
￿rst relates to the collection of seigniorage. If ￿ uctuations in economic activity lead to regular
changes in revenues from conventional sources of taxation governments may be forced to vary
seigniorage to compensate, especially in developing countries in which there are limits to bor-
rowing (Little et al. 1993). The extent to which governments choose to resolve transitory de￿cits
through temporary changes in seigniorage, as opposed to changes in spending or other tax rates,
will a⁄ect the volatility of the growth rate of the money supply and hence the volatility of in￿ a-
tion. The greater the welfare losses associated with in￿ ation volatility the stronger the incentive
for governments to pursue means other than seigniorage to compensate for ￿ uctuations in the
tax base. In open economies in￿ ation volatility will be relatively costly if international trade
induces stronger competition in markets supplied by domestic producers of tradables. This will
increase the elasticity of the demand curve facing each ￿rm and a given amount of in￿ ation
volatility will then translate into larger ￿ uctuations in revenues, reducing welfare if ￿rms are
averse to sales risk. In order to avoid this welfare loss the government can use measures other
than the in￿ ation tax to deal with temporary reductions in revenues and this will reduce in￿ ation
volatility.
The second mechanism relates to the set of markets in which countries participate. If the
structure of consumption and production shifts towards high value added products in￿ ation
volatility likely decreases because the terms of trade for such products are more stable (Bax-
1ter and Kouparitsas 2000). We argue that trade openness supports this transition. In terms
of consumption trade contributes to the supply of high value added consumer goods, many of
which are not produced in low income countries, whilst on the production side trade can sup-
port industrialisation through providing access to larger markets. To the extent that openness
contributes to these forms of structural change the terms of trade will stabilise, and in￿ ation
volatility will decrease.
Preliminary evidence suggests that trade integration is indeed associated with in￿ ation sta-
bility: Brahmbhatt and Dadush (1996) report that during the period 1984-93 in￿ ation volatility
in countries that were slow to integrate was twice that in countries that achieved rapid inte-
gration.1 Similarly, large reductions in in￿ ation volatility are often observed after the dates
identi￿ed by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) as marking the start of a liberal trade regime, e.g.
the coe¢ cient of variation for in￿ ation during the ￿ve years before and after the liberalization
date fell from 1:25 to 0:37 in the case of the Philippines and from 8:83 to 1:21 in the case of
Cameroon (￿gures are based on our calculations). More recently, Lo et al. (2005) provide cross-
country regression evidence demonstrating a negative correlation between openness and in￿ ation
volatility.2 However, existing studies have not tried to separate correlation and causation when
examining the evidence linking openness and in￿ ation volatility, nor has the robustness of the
relationship been investigated in any detail.
This paper provides a ￿rst systematic account of the openness-in￿ ation volatility relationship.
Using panel data spanning 96 countries and four decades we demonstrate a robust negative
e⁄ect of openness on in￿ ation volatility. Our work departs from previous research in that
we move beyond cross-sectional correlations and utilise temporal variation in the data. More
importantly, we address the potential endogeneity of openness by using lagged values of openness
and population size as instruments in estimating a dynamic panel model.
The evidence that we present parallels the negative relationship between openness and av-
1In￿ ation standard deviations for slow and fast integrators were 13.27% and 7.24% respectively. The ￿speed
of integration index￿is based on four indicators: the ratio of trade to GDP, the ratio of foreign direct investment
to GDP, institutional investors￿credit ratings and the share of manufactures in exports.
2Two other studies, Bleaney and Fielding (2002) and Gruben and McLeod (2004), provide brief evidence on
this topic.
2erage in￿ ation documented in Romer (1993).3 However, we show that openness has a negative
and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on in￿ ation volatility even after controlling for mean in￿ ation.
We demonstrate the robustness of our ￿ndings to an unusually wide range of controls, including
per capita income, country size, output volatility and the exchange rate regime. Furthermore,
our results are not a⁄ected by cross-country di⁄erences in ￿nancial development, indebtedness,
political constraints, the adoption of in￿ ation targeting and participation in IMF structural ad-
justment programmes. However, the relationship is shown to be stronger amongst developing
and emerging market economies than amongst OECD countries.
In order to evaluate the proposed channels linking openness and in￿ ation volatility we aug-
ment our basic regressions with measures of the volatility of money supply growth (which cap-
tures the importance of the seigniorage channel) and terms of trade growth (which proxies the
e⁄ect of greater international price stability in markets for high value added products). This
leads to a large reduction in the e⁄ect of openness, such that it is insigni￿cant at conventional
levels. Auxiliary regressions are then presented to show that trade openness is a negative predic-
tor of monetary and terms of trade volatility. These ￿ndings are consistent with the hypothesis
that openness reduces in￿ ation volatility through ￿rst decreasing monetary and terms of trade
volatility.
Understanding the determinants of in￿ ation volatility is important. The remits of many
central banks stipulate not only a target for in￿ ation, but also the bands in which in￿ ation
should ￿ uctuate, suggesting that policy-makers care about the level of in￿ ation volatility. This
may be due to a belief that in￿ ation volatility in￿ uences broader macroeconomic performance,
for example Elder (2004) and Byrne and Davis (2004) provide evidence that volatile in￿ ation
reduces investment and growth. In related work Buraschi and Jiltsov (2004) present a model
in which in￿ ation volatility increases the risk premium in asset markets. Our results are also of
interest because they complement research into other forms of macroeconomic volatility. Recent
evidence on the relationship between openness and output volatility is ambiguous, suggesting
either a positive or a negative link depending on the sample coverage and the set of controls;
3The Romer evidence has been challenged, see for example Bleaney (1999) and Alfaro (2005), but in a recent
contribution Gruben and McLeod (2004) report that greater openness is associated with lower mean in￿ ation,
especially during the 1990s.
3see for example Easterly et al. (2001) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). The results
presented in this paper indicate that the relationship between openness and in￿ ation volatility
is more systematic, i.e. openness appears to exert a stronger e⁄ect on nominal volatility than
on real volatility.
The remainder of this paper expands on these points and is organised as follows. Section
2 discusses potential channels linking openness and in￿ ation volatility. Section 3 sets out the
econometric approach and describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results and in
Section 5 we interpret our ￿ndings in terms of the mechanisms discussed in Section 2. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Openness and in￿ ation volatility
In this section we trace out possible channels linking openness and in￿ ation volatility. One view
is that openness actually increases instability. For example, if trade is based around primary
commodities, as has traditionally been the case in many developing countries, openness implies
greater exposure to some of the most volatile international markets. Similarly, openness increases
vulnerability to exchange rate ￿ uctuations, although the importance of this will depend on the
exchange rate regime.4
On the other hand, there are several channels through which openness may reduce in￿ ation
volatility. The ￿rst idea that we emphasise derives from a public ￿nance interpretation of the
in￿ ation process. Consider a government that is solvent over the long-term but faces some
variability in the revenues that it collects, e.g. due to business cycle ￿ uctuations that a⁄ect
the tax base. If there are some constraints on government borrowing, as is often the case
in developing countries (see Little et al. 1993), periods of low revenues will require either
￿scal contractions (reductions in spending or increases in tax rates) or temporary recourse to
seigniorage (the in￿ ation tax). The relevance of such a scenario is demonstrated by Aisen and
Veiga (2005a) who ￿nd that during periods of negative GDP growth (and hence low tax revenues)
4There is also a literature on the consequences of greater ￿nancial openness, which can raise exposure to pro-
cyclical capital ￿ ows and therefore increase volatility (Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee 2004). We address this
possibility in the discussion of our results in section 4 and also in our special appendix for referees.
4seigniorage requirements increase.5 The argument that we advance is that in these situations
reliance on seigniorage is negatively related to openness. This implies that when the tax base
is temporarily diminished, episodes in which seigniorage is increased to generate income and
then reduced once revenues from conventional taxation have recovered can be avoided. As a
result the variability of the growth rate of the monetary base, and hence the growth rate of the
aggregate money supply, will decrease. Assuming that in￿ ation partly depends on the rate of
monetary expansion, in￿ ation volatility will be lower in open economies (the monetary view of
in￿ ation has often been challenged but the empirical evidence indicates that it is relevant to
developing countries, see Loungani and Swagel 2001).
A key question is why should openness deter seigniorage during periods in which other tax
revenues are temporarily low? The explanation that we focus upon is that the costs of in￿ ation
and in￿ ation volatility may be larger in more open economies, as argued by Temple (2002). For
example, openness increases competition in markets supplied by domestic producers of tradables
and this causes the demand curve facing each ￿rm to become more price elastic, see Chen et al.
(2004). A given amount of in￿ ation volatility will then translate into larger ￿ uctuations in sales
and revenues and, assuming ￿rms are averse to sales risk, in￿ ation volatility will induce greater
welfare loss.6 This may strengthen government commitment to stable in￿ ation and as a result
governments will rely on spending cuts or increases in direct tax rates during periods of ￿scal
stress, not seigniorage.7
Aisen and Veiga (2005a) show that a de jure measure of openness taken from the Index
5Catao and Terrones (2005) present a model in which ￿scal de￿cits cause in￿ ation via the seigniorage channel
and provide evidence consistent with the model. Click (1998) and Aisen and Veiga (2005b) provide empirical
evidence on the determinants of seigniorage and in￿ ation respectively, and both studies are motivated from a
public ￿nance perspective.
6Razin (2005) develops a micro-founded model in which trade and ￿nancial openness increase society￿ s aversion
to unexpected in￿ ation. To the extent that more volatile in￿ ation implies greater variability in the unexpected
component of in￿ ation, in￿ ation volatility will be more costly in open economies.
7An alternative reason for openness deterring temporary recourse to seigniorage is that over time the revenues
obtained from taxing tradables are less volatile than those obtained from taxing non-tradables, e.g. because the
former can be monitored and taxed as they pass through ports and are therefore less likely to be diverted to the
black economy in the aftermath of shocks.
5of Economic Freedom (Gwartney and Lawson 2002) reduces the level of seigniorage.8 The
argument that we present extends this relationship so that openness decreases the variance of
seigniorage (and hence in￿ ation) through creating incentives for credit constrained governments
to pursue other ways of balancing budgets when revenues ￿ uctuate, and in section 5 we present
evidence consistent with this channel. Of course, in practice the means and variances of both
seigniorage and in￿ ation are highly correlated. In our empirical work we therefore take care to
test the hypothesis that openness decreases in￿ ation volatility after controlling for the important
relationship between openness and mean in￿ ation documented in Romer (1993).9
A second channel through which openness can a⁄ect in￿ ation volatility is the structure of
consumption. Increases in income levels likely induce a partial shift in consumer demand, away
from low value added agricultural products and towards manufactured goods. The degree of
substitution in consumption will depend on openness to trade because developing countries often
lack capacity in the supply of certain consumer goods but can compensate by importing these
goods in order to re-structure consumption in favour of high value added products. As terms of
trade volatility for manufactured goods is one third less than aggregate terms of trade volatility
(Baxter and Kouparitsas 2000) this change in the structure of consumption, achieved through the
￿ exibility in supply provided by trade, will stabilise consumer price in￿ ation. Hence, countries
that open up more rapidly, be it due to improved market access or governments reducing tari⁄s
and quotas, will experience larger reductions in in￿ ation volatility.
An example of this mechanism taking e⁄ect occurred in South Africa following the removal
of tari⁄s and other trade barriers at the start of the 1990s, a process linked to political reforms
that occurred at the time. This caused the share of exports plus imports in GDP to rise, from
45% during the period 1991 ￿ 95 to 53:2% during the period 1996 ￿ 2000. Furthermore, most
of this increase in trade was concentrated in the manufacturing sector. Aron and Muellbauer
(2000) develop an econometric model for the share of imported manufactures in total domestic
8Similarly, Terra (1998) shows that average in￿ ation in Latin American countries following the debt crisis period
is negatively related to openness, and explains this ￿nding in terms of debt repayment ￿nanced via seigniorage.
9The link between openness and the level of in￿ ation has been challenged by Bleaney (1999) and Alfaro (2005),
while Gruben and McLeod (2004) argue that the original Romer (1993) ￿nding is robust, particularly during the
1990s.
6consumption of manufactures and ￿nd that the underlying trend in this quantity rose by 40%
between 1991 and 1998, i.e. stronger trade links boosted the supply of high value added products
for which domestic production capacity was limited. Against this background of increasing
openness and greater foreign supply of manufactured goods the standard deviation of consumer
price in￿ ation fell from 3:04% for the period 1991 ￿ 95 to 2:16% for the period 1996 ￿ 2000
(￿gures are based on our calculation). Although this evidence does not demonstrate a causal
link, it is consistent with the mechanism that we have described.
The link between openness and the structure of imports/consumption is related to the idea
that trade serves as a risk-coping mechanism. In much of the developing world climatic shocks
a⁄ect in￿ ation volatility through their impact on food supply. Relatively open economies have
been better able to reduce the sensitivity of food prices to climatic shocks by importing food
during times of shortage, see Joshi and Little (1994) for an account of the Indian experience.
Openness may also restrict in￿ ation volatility via export structures. Export prices are not
included in the consumer price index directly but may exert an indirect e⁄ect via aggregate
demand. In developing countries an export price boom, for example, typically increases govern-
ment revenues, especially if major export industries are state owned, and these windfall gains
are often used for wasteful public consumption that raises excess demand and in￿ ation for some
period (Lal and Myint 1996; Collier et al. 1999). A shift in exports from agriculture to manu-
facturing will stabilise the terms of trade because volatility is lower in high value added sectors.
This is likely to reduce the volatility of government spending, which will in turn reduce in￿ ation
volatility.
A key question, then, is whether or not openness is associated with structural change in
production, towards manufacturing. Breinlich (2005) presents a model in which a geographic
predisposition to trade provides access to large markets and thereby supports industrialization
through providing su¢ cient demand to absorb increased output of manufactures. Evidence
reported by Breinlich supports the predictions of the model, as do the recent experiences of
China and other East Asian countries in which trade has underpinned manufacturing growth.10
10Models of the industrialisation process are clearly most relevant to developing nations. In high income
countries greater openness need not be associated with manufacturing growth. Indeed, international trade is
sometimes blamed for de-industrialisation in OECD countries. This suggests that the link between openness
7In related work Hausmann and Gavin (1996) note that regional trade agreements in Latin
America are associated with an increase in the share of manufactures in total exports, suggesting
that trade supports expansion in high value added industries. Our own empirical analysis also
supports a link running from trade to manufacturing growth. A log-linear panel regression of the
manufacturing share in GDP on the once lagged trade share in GDP plus ￿xed e⁄ects and time
dummies yields an elasticity of 0:16 and a t-ratio of 2:23. If the model is extended to include
the ￿rst lags of per capita income and a measure of real exchange rate over-valuation (cited
by Dollar (1992) as a barrier to industrialisation) the openness elasticity increases to 0:17 and
the corresponding t-ratio is 1:81.11 This suggests that openness Granger causes manufacturing
growth and supports the view that openness reduces in￿ ation volatility by shifting production
to sectors that are more stable.
The hypothesis that openness decreases in￿ ation volatility through shifting the consumption
basket and the composition of exports towards high value added goods for which the terms of
trade are more stable is closely related to the notion that the level of development in￿ uences
volatility. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) present a model in which countries with higher incomes
are better able to undertake investment in indivisible forms of capital and therefore achieve a
more balanced sectoral distribution of output. Empirical evidence presented by Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997) is shown to support this prediction. Clearly, the level of development is also likely
to play a role in reducing in￿ ation volatility, and therefore in our empirical analysis we control
for per capita income in testing for a relationship between openness and in￿ ation volatility.
The above discussion has highlighted the ways in which openness may a⁄ect in￿ ation volatil-
ity. Before describing the methods that we use in order to cast some light on these mechanisms,
we close this section with a brief review of the empirical evidence on openness and other forms
of macroeconomic volatility. Devereux and Lane (2003) show that bilateral nominal exchange
rate volatility is negatively related to bilateral trade ￿ ows and attribute this relationship to
the standard optimal currency area hypothesis that exchange rate stability is more likely to be
and in￿ ation volatility may be less strong amongst high income countries and we address this possibility in our
empirical work.
11The data used for this calculation are based on 5 year observation windows, 1961 ￿ 65 through 1996 ￿ 2000,
and cover 106 countries (the panel is unbalanced).
8pursued amongst groups of countries with strong trade links. Evidence linking openness and
the volatility of GDP growth is mixed, as noted in a recent review by Winters et al. (2004).
Easterly et al. (2001) estimate a positive e⁄ect of openness on growth volatility using a sample
of developed and developing countries, but the e⁄ect becomes insigni￿cant on controlling for the
initial level of development. In contrast, Mobarak (2005) estimates a negative impact of open-
ness on the volatility of output growth, while Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) ￿nd that
the relationship is negative amongst non-industrial countries but positive amongst industrial
countries.
3 Data and methodology
In this section we describe the data and our econometric methodology. The in￿ ation data
measure the annual rate of consumer price in￿ ation at the quarterly frequency and are taken from
International Financial Statistics (appendix B provides comprehensive notes on data sources).
We compile data for an unbalanced panel of 96 countries; the longest period for which data are
available for any single country is 1961 : 1 to 2000 : 4.12 It is important to note that as we
have de￿ned in￿ ation as growth in the price index over the last year rather than the last quarter
there cannot be seasonal e⁄ects in the data that induce spurious volatility.
In order to measure in￿ ation volatility we divide the data for each country into a maximum
of 8 windows, each of 20 quarters (1961 : 1 to 1965 : 4, 1966 : 1 to 1970 : 4 and so on).13 For
each sub-period we then compute in￿ ation volatility (V INF) as
V INF = ln[1 + sd(INF)] (1)
where sd is a standard deviation and INF is the decimal in￿ ation rate (3% in￿ ation is
12The 96 countries correspond to the sample used by Romer (1993) in analysing the relationship between
openness and mean in￿ ation, except that we have excluded the four Gulf oil states considered by Romer, and
included Chad, a country for which Romer was unable to obtain su¢ cient data. Appendix A lists the 96 countries
included in the sample.
13The full set of time observations are typically only available for OECD countries and the larger emerging
market economies. As a result, the panel that we use is unbalanced. The maximum number of time observations
per country is 8, the minimum 3 and (in the largest sample used) the average is 5:6.
9represented as 0:03). A standard practice in the literature is to take log transforms to downweight
very large readings that may occur during hyperin￿ ation episodes. One disadvantage of the log
transform is that it overweights observations very close to zero (the log of such a reading is a
large negative number). To avoid this, we consider the log of one plus the decimal standard
deviation of in￿ ation. However, later sections in this paper show that our results are robust to
alternative measures of V INF.
In order for the standard deviation to be a valid measure of volatility the mean of the data
must be constant over the period for which it is calculated and must not exhibit a secular trend.
By measuring volatility at the ￿ve-year frequency rather than over several decades we reduce
the chances of identifying spurious volatility associated with shifts in mean in￿ ation. On the
other hand, short window lengths risk confusing breaks in mean in￿ ation with persistent shocks
around a stable mean. Therefore, in checking robustness, we consider window lengths of 3 years
and 8 years.14
The data for in￿ ation volatility include some outliers, even after the transformation in (1).
In order to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers we exclude observations more than
three standard deviations from the mean of the unconditional distribution. This leads to 12
observations, approximately 1:5% of the sample, being dropped. These observations are mainly
for Latin American countries that experienced extreme in￿ ation during the 1980s.15
Openness is de￿ned as the natural log of imports plus exports relative to GDP, and is denoted
OPEN.16 The log trade to GDP ratio is a frequently used proxy for openness and can arguably
account for some of the core mechanisms linking openness and in￿ ation volatility emphasised
14A further requirement for the standard deviation to be a valid measure of volatility is that the in￿ ation
rate be an I(0) variable rather than an I(1) variable. The stationarity of the in￿ ation rate, at least within 5 year
windows, is a maintained assumption in our analysis. Hendry (2001) argues strongly that the in￿ ation rate should
be treated as an I(0) process rather than an I(1) process.
15As a result of the outlier exclusion procedure Brazil and Nicaragua drop out of the sample because the
estimation technique that we employ requires that three consecutive observations be available in order for a country
to be included in the panel. Although these countries represent interesting examples of successful reductions in
in￿ ation volatility, our sample still includes many Latin American countries whose experiences have been similar.
We argue that our ￿ndings concerning openness and in￿ ation volatility are applicable to the Latin American
experience.
16We checked OPEN for outliers using the criterion applied to V INF, but none were found.
10in our earlier discussion.17 However, being a de facto measure of openness, it is potentially
endogenous, warranting the use of instrumental variables in the estimation procedure.
Table 1 describes the evolution of in￿ ation volatility and the trade ratio during the period
1971 ￿ 2000 for di⁄erent groups of countries.18 For the largest sample of countries in￿ ation
volatility has nearly halved since the early 1970s. However, this reduction appears to be more
pronounced in East Asia and Western Europe and North America. In contrast, Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America have experienced only a marginal fall in in￿ ation volatility since 1971
- the secular decline in in￿ ation volatility observed in developed countries is absent. The average
trade to GDP ratio has exhibited a steady increase since the early 1970s, though the experiences
of individual groups of countries do vary.
In Figure 1 we plot V INF against OPEN. Even before controlling for country ￿xed e⁄ects,
time dummies, other regressors and potential reverse causation a negative relationship between
openness and in￿ ation volatility can be observed. Each graph reveals some extreme observations,
even after the steps taken to deal with outliers. However, in the robustness section we show
that our main results do not depend on these observations.
3.1 The econometric model
In order to estimate the e⁄ect of openness on in￿ ation volatility we consider the following model:
V INFit = ￿ + ￿V INFit￿1 + ￿OPENit + ￿i + "it (2)
where i denotes a country, t a 5 year period, ￿i a country ￿xed e⁄ect and "it the error term.
The lagged dependent variable in (2) controls for persistence in in￿ ation volatility, which may
be intrinsic or simply a proxy for other determinants of volatility that are omitted at this stage.
The approach to estimating (2) follows Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover
(1995). In order to eliminate the time invariant ￿xed e⁄ects we take ￿rst di⁄erences of (2) to
17The use of the log transform is not crucial to our results: If we use the untransformed trade share in our
regressions the main implications of our empirical analysis are unchanged.
18Table 1 focuses on 51 countries. Data for the other 45 countries in the sample start after 1971 and therefore
their inclusion in Table 1 would mean that the number of countries ￿ uctuates across the columns, something that
we wish to avoid.
11obtain
￿V INFit = ￿￿V INFit￿1 + ￿￿OPENit + ￿"it (3)
Estimating (3) by least squares is problematic. Firstly, the transformed error term is cor-
related with the lagged dependent variable (both include "it￿1) and this will lead to biased
parameter estimates. Secondly, OPEN may be endogenously determined, e.g. if volatile in￿ a-
tion is an impediment to trade then causation will run from left to right in (3) and the impact
of openness on in￿ ation volatility will be overstated. Alternatively, there may exist a common
cause for openness and in￿ ation volatility. One possibility is that each is the result of deeper
preferences that shape macroeconomic policy, whilst another is that shocks to the terms of trade
a⁄ect both variables, e.g. a collapse in export prices may reduce the nominal value of exports
such that OPENit falls and at the same time cause aggregate demand to change so that in￿ ation
volatility increases.
In order to address these problems Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a generalised method of
moments (GMM) technique. Assuming that the errors in equation (2) are serially uncorrelated
and that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with future realisations of the errors (their
endogeneity implies that they are correlated with only current values of the errors) lags of V INF
and OPEN dated t￿2 and earlier are valid instruments with which to identify the exogenous
variation in openness.19 A potential drawback of this Di⁄erenced-GMM estimator is that in the
presence of high time-series persistence and short panels, lagged levels of the variables may be
poor instruments for subsequent ￿rst di⁄erences, leading to ￿nite sample biases (Blundell and
Bond 1998). An alternative approach, suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998), is the System-GMM estimator, which uses lagged di⁄erences of each variable
as instruments in estimating the levels relationship in (2), and combines this information with
the Di⁄erenced-GMM estimates of equation (3). The validity of these instruments requires a
constant correlation between V INFit and the ￿xed e⁄ect, and between OPENit and the ￿xed
e⁄ect. If this is the case, ￿V INFit￿1 and ￿OPENit￿1 are orthogonal to future realisations of
19To be precise, the GMM estimator for equation (3) uses the following moment conditions:
E(V INFi;t￿s￿"it) = 0; E(OPENi;t￿s￿"it) = 0 for t = 3;4;:::T; and s = 2.
12the error terms and represent valid instruments for estimating the parameters of (2).20
In implementing the System-GMM estimator we utilise external instruments based on lagged
values of log population size, POP. This term is the time-varying element of a standard gravity
model of trade ￿ ows; see for example Frankel and Romer (1999). Although gravity equations
typically use population size to explain cross-sectional di⁄erences in openness, we ￿nd that past
population size helps to predict the evolution of openness and can therefore be used to increase
the e¢ ciency of the GMM estimator. The role of the external instrument is further examined
in the discussion of the empirical results in Section 4.
The validity of the instruments can be evaluated using the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions and Lagrange Multiplier tests for the absence of second order serial correlation
(Arellano and Bond 1991). It is important to note that the ￿rst di⁄erenced transformation
yielding (3) induces an MA(1) error structure, and therefore we expect that the ￿rst-di⁄erenced
residuals will be negatively autocorrelated at the ￿rst lag but uncorrelated at the second lag.
The estimated standard errors take account of the ￿rst-order negative autocorrelation and any
heteroscedasticity in the residuals, see Arellano and Bond (1991). As recommended by Blundell
and Bond (1998) the estimates that we report are based on 1-step GMM estimation in which
equal weight is placed on each moment condition.21
4 Empirical results
In Table 2 we present our basic empirical results. Columns 1 ￿ 4 list the ordinary least squares
(OLS), within groups (WG), Di⁄erenced-GMM and System-GMM estimates of a model in which
in￿ ation volatility depends on its own lag and openness, plus a full set of time dummies. The
Di⁄erenced-GMM estimates use as instruments V INFt￿2, OPENt￿2, POPt￿2 and POPt￿3 and
the System-GMM estimates use as additional instruments ￿OPENt￿1 and ￿POPt￿2.22 In each
20Speci￿cally, the following additional moment conditions are available: E(￿V INFit￿s(￿i +"it)) = 0 for s = 1
and E(￿OPENit￿s(￿i + "it)) = 0 for s = 1.
21All estimations are conducted using the DPD package in Pc-Give, see Doornik and Hendry (2001).
22The di⁄erenced lagged dependent variable is not used as an instrument in the levels part of the system
estimator because the marginal restrictions required in order for it to be a valid instrument were rejected by a
Sargan test. It appears that there has been some ￿ in￿ ation volatility convergence￿during the sample period -
13case the e⁄ect of openness on in￿ ation volatility is negative and this relationship is propagated
through time by the positively signed autoregressive term.
The model that we emphasise is the System-GMM estimate in column 4 which shows that
OPEN impacts V INF with a coe¢ cient of ￿:086. The within groups standard deviation of
openness is 0:198 while that for in￿ ation volatility is 0:067.23 Hence, a one standard deviation
increase in openness yields a 0:25 standard deviation reduction in in￿ ation volatility in the ￿rst
5 years. It should be noted, however, that additional controls have not yet been introduced.
In the second part of this section we show that including further controls reduces the openness
coe¢ cient by one half, leaving a modest e⁄ect.
Before investigating the robustness of our results we consider the properties of the instru-
ments. The Sargan test for the validity of the over-identifying moment conditions used in column
4 yields a p-value of 35%. In order to check that this outcome is not a Type II error based on
pooling valid and invalid instruments we perform separate Di⁄erence-Sargan (D-Sargan) tests
for the moment conditions associated with each variable. The p-values are 20% (V INF), 76%
(OPEN) and 34% (POP), suggesting that each type of instrument is individually valid. Fur-
thermore, the AR(1) and AR(2) tests provide strong support for the hypothesis that the errors
in (2) are serially uncorrelated, a necessary condition for instrument validity.
A related question concerns the explanatory power of the instruments. If the instruments are
weak the exogenous variation in openness will be limited and this may distort inference (Stock,
Wright and Yogo 2002). To address this issue we regressed ￿V INFt￿1 and ￿OPENit on the
instruments used for the di⁄erenced equation, and V INFt￿1 and OPENt on the instruments
used for the levels equation, and performed F-tests for the joint signi￿cance of the regressors.
The test statistics were 27:96 (￿V INFt￿1 equation), 23:16 (￿OPENit), 20:04 (V INFt￿1) and
83:29 (OPENt), each of which is signi￿cant at the 0:1% level.24 Hence, the instruments appear
to have considerable explanatory power. On a related theme, Blundell and Bond (1998) show
that a GMM estimate of the autoregressive parameter that is close to the WG estimate typically
countries with initially high volatility experience relatively large reductions in volatility during later periods. This
implies that ￿V INFit￿1 is not orthogonal to ￿i in equation (2).
23These statistics are calculated from the residuals obtained by regressing openness and in￿ ation volatility on
a full set of country dummies.
24Each regression contained a full set of period dummies, but these dummies are not included in the F-tests.
14re￿ ects a problem of weak instruments. The centrality of the Di⁄erenced-GMM and System-
GMM estimates with respect to the OLS-WG range is further evidence that our results are not
due to weak instruments.
In the ￿nal two columns of Table 2 we take a further look at the role of the external instru-
ment, POP. In column 5 all terms in POP are dropped from the instrument set. A comparison
of these results with those in column 4 indicates that the main role of POP is to increase the
e¢ ciency of the estimation. This is seen most clearly in the case of the openness e⁄ect, which is
actually of greater magnitude in column 5 than in column 4 but yields a smaller t-ratio because
its standard error increases three-fold. Hence, the external instrument does not induce the sign
or magnitude of OPEN but instead increases the precision of the estimation. In column 6 we
address the possibility that the signi￿cance of OPEN is due to POP having been excluded from
the regressors. The results indicate that this is not the case. Instead, changes in population size
matter for in￿ ation volatility only through inducing a change in openness, i.e. POP satis￿es
the standard requirements of an instrumental variable.
4.1 Robustness: Adding further controls
In this sub-section we add further controls to the basic model. The largest sample for which
all of the regressors are available comprises 451 observations drawn from 84 countries and this
is the sample that we use in each column of Table 3 (the 12 countries that drop out of the 96
country sample used in Table 2 are listed in appendix A). In order to conserve space we focus
on the System-GMM estimates.
The ￿rst column reproduces the simple speci￿cation for the new sample size. The magnitude
of each coe¢ cient falls slightly but the qualitative results are robust. Column 2 controls for the
natural log of one plus mean in￿ ation (INF) and uses as instruments INFt￿3 and ￿INFt￿2
(instruments at shorter lags are invalid according to a D-Sargan test). Mean in￿ ation is highly
signi￿cant, re￿ ecting its strong correlation with in￿ ation volatility. The openness coe¢ cient falls
to ￿:044, a little more than half its value in column 4 of Table 2, but owing to greater precision
in the estimation it remains signi￿cant at the 5% level, i.e. openness reduces in￿ ation volatility
even amongst countries that have the same average in￿ ation. The autoregressive parameter is
15close to zero after controlling for mean in￿ ation. Indeed, deleting the autoregressive term from
column 2 leaves the results practically unchanged - the openness coe¢ cient remains ￿:044 and
the t-ratio is 2:26 (static estimates of regressions 3 ￿ 10 are reported in Table A2 in the special
appendix for referees).25
We experimented with two variations on the column 2 speci￿cation. Firstly, given the
important relationship between mean in￿ ation and in￿ ation volatility, we de￿ned the regression
in terms of the log coe¢ cient of variation for in￿ ation (the standard deviation of in￿ ation relative
to mean in￿ ation). A GMM-SYS regression of this term on its ￿rst lag plus openness yields an
openness e⁄ect that is signi￿cant at the 5% level. Secondly, we experimented with a non-linear
relationship between the ￿rst two moments of in￿ ation: Adding the square of mean in￿ ation to
column 2 gives an openness coe¢ cient of ￿:041 and a corresponding t-ratio of 2:11 (full details
of these two experiments are available on request).
In column 3 we control for the natural log of GDP per capita (RGDP) and add the second
lag of that variable to the instruments.26 This is measured in 1996 US$ and corresponds to the
￿rst year from each of the 5 year windows for which in￿ ation volatility is measured. The e⁄ect
of RGDP is negative but close to zero. Further (unreported) experimentation shows that this
is due to INF having been included in the regression (the e⁄ect of RGDP is entirely mediated
through mean in￿ ation). The openness coe¢ cient is further diminished relative to column 1 but
is signi￿cant at the 6% level. Column 4 controls for the log product of population and per capita
income, a measure of economic size. This is a potentially important control when analysing the
e⁄ects of openness, see Lane (1997), but does not change the picture in this case.
We next address the possibility that openness exerts di⁄erent e⁄ects on primary commodity
exporters. In section 2 we noted that greater openness may increase volatility, or reduce it by
less, if openness implies expansion in markets for primary commodities, which are relatively
volatile. The dummy PRIMEXP is equal to unity for countries for which more than 50% of
25It should be noted that although originally proposed for dynamic panel models, the System-GMM technique
is an e¢ cient estimator for static panels and has often been used in this context, see Beck (2002).
26Unless otherwise stated, regressions 3￿9 use the second lag of the marginal variable as an additional instru-
ment. Instruments based on lagged ￿rst di⁄erences of the marginal terms are not used because we found that in
some speci￿cations the Sargan p-value was close to unity, which is a sign that the instrument set is too large and
that estimation may be imprecise.
16exports during the period 1988￿92 are fuels or other primary commodities, and zero otherwise.
In column 5 the negative impact of openness on in￿ ation volatility is smaller amongst primary
commodity exporters, but the interaction term is insigni￿cant and the main conclusion is that
the overall e⁄ect of openness is negative amongst both groups of countries.27
In section 2 we also noted that openness may increase in￿ ation volatility if it is associated
with increased ￿nancial ￿ ows, which are often pro-cyclical and can amplify volatility. Measures
of ￿nancial openness such as foreign direct investment relative to GDP turn out insigni￿cant,
whereas trade openness becomes more negative and is signi￿cant at the 1% level, indicating that
￿nancial variables may control for one mechanism through which openness increases volatility
(results are presented in a special appendix for referees).
The next idea that we explore is that movements in in￿ ation volatility result from changes
in the size of economic shocks. This is the ￿ good luck￿hypothesis in the literature on volatility
in the United States, see Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2002). We control for the natural log of
one plus the decimal standard deviation of annual output growth (V OL). If smaller supply and
demand shocks drive output and in￿ ation volatility, and the link between openness and in￿ ation
volatility is coincidental, the augmented regression should reveal this fact. In column 6 openness
remains signi￿cant at the 5% level while output volatility is insigni￿cant.
The weak e⁄ect of output volatility could be due to supply shocks that reduce output growth
and raise in￿ ation. In the aftermath of such shocks a policy authority can trade-o⁄higher output
volatility for lower in￿ ation volatility, or vice versa, through shifting aggregate demand. This
may weaken the positive association between output and in￿ ation variance. In column 7 we
control for the natural log of one plus the decimal standard deviation of the trade weighted
mean of output growth in the ￿ve largest trading partners of each country (TPV OL), which is
generally beyond the control of the domestic policy authority. The e⁄ect of TPV OL is stronger
than that of V OL (the large point estimate is due to the very small standard deviation of
TPV OL). We also estimated (but do not report) a model interacting TPV OL with OPEN, to
allow in￿ ation volatility to be more responsive to foreign GDP volatility in more open economies.
This term generated a coe¢ cient of 0:555 (t = 2:03), while the coe¢ cient for OPEN was ￿:050
27A caveat that should be added here is that PRIMEXP is time invariant. A better measure would allow for
time variation in this index.
17(t = 2:43). The mean of TPV OL is :02, which implies that the total marginal e⁄ect of OPEN is
negative, even though it appears that sensitivity to global shocks is one channel through which
openness can increase in￿ ation volatility.
In column 8 we control for the natural log of one plus the black market exchange rate
premium (BMP), de￿ned as the percentage markup of the black market exchange rate over
the o¢ cial rate. This is regarded as a measure of market distortions, and the policies that
induce these distortions may also be a source of in￿ ation volatility. More speci￿cally, controlling
for BMP may shed some light on an alternative interpretation of our results, which is that
they are a by-product of policy reforms implemented in return for assistance from bodies such
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such reforms often require that countries remove
trade barriers and adopt more disciplined ￿scal and monetary policy, which will reduce in￿ ation
volatility. The black market premium is regarded as a measure of the intensity of market
distortions and is therefore likely to be inversely related to success in implementing reforms.
The fact that OPEN remains signi￿cant when controlling for BMP suggests that the negative
relationship between openness and in￿ ation volatility is not simply a by-product of pro-market
reforms.28
In column 9 we control for the natural log of one plus the average rate of economic growth
(GROWTH), the rationale being that during ￿ good times￿in￿ ation volatility may be more easy
to control. The results indicate some evidence for this and the openness e⁄ect is diminished and
is signi￿cant at only the 10% level. However, in the next column we pool all of the controls used
in Table 3 and ￿nd that OPEN is signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Additional robustness checks are reported in the special appendix. We consider alternative
de￿nitions of in￿ ation volatility and openness and numerous controls, including ￿nancial depth,
an index of political constraints, government size and climatic volatility. The negative e⁄ect of
openness is robust in each case.
28The insigni￿cance of BMP is surprising, but turns out to be a consequence of controlling for mean in￿ ation.
If mean in￿ ation is removed from column 8 the t-ratio for BMP rises to 1:97.
184.2 The role of the exchange rate regime
A ￿xed exchange rate combined with capital mobility is thought to restrict discretionary mon-
etary policy by forcing a country to adopt foreign monetary policy. This may reduce in￿ ation
volatility. Alfaro (2005) ￿nds that the exchange rate regime (not openness) explains average
in￿ ation performance. On the other hand Tornell and Velasco (2000) show that ￿xed rates
can induce ￿scal laxity, and this may increase volatility. Bleaney and Fielding (2002) present a
model in which tighter exchange rate pegs reduce in￿ ation volatility except in the case of the
multi-lateral pegs maintained by the Francophone countries in Africa, which increase volatility
because the peg prevents monetary authorities from o⁄setting the e⁄ects of external shocks.
We consider the de facto exchange rate regime classi￿cation proposed by Reinhart and Rogo⁄
(2004). This provides an index in the range 1 ￿ 4 where 4 denotes greatest exchange rate
￿ exibility.29 In contrast to the o¢ cial IMF classi￿cation the Reinhart-Rogo⁄scheme is based on
actual exchange rate movements rather than the policy a central bank claims to have followed.
Furthermore, the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ scheme incorporates information on black market currency
exchange in addition to o¢ cial purchases.30
In column 1 of Table 4 we add the exchange rate regime indicator (XRATE) to our baseline
regression and in column 2 we add the square of the exchange rate regime in order to test for
non-linearities of the sort discussed by Bleaney and Fielding (2002). The additional control
does not alter the role of openness and is statistically insigni￿cant. Adding mean in￿ ation to
the column 1 speci￿cation induces a negative sign for XRATE that is signi￿cant at the 10%
level. This may occur because the e⁄ect of a ￿xed exchange rate in restricting discretionary
policy is re￿ ected in mean in￿ ation, such that after controlling for INF the partial e⁄ect of
XRATE captures only the increases in volatility that occur if ￿xed rates restrict stabilisation
29A ￿fth category is also available but this refers to countries with ￿ freely falling￿ rates. One criterion for
identifying such cases is an in￿ ation rate above 40%, i.e. a large positive in￿ ation shock automatically places a
country in the top tier and therefore this category will be highly endogenous. Consequently we focus on categories
1 ￿ 4.
30In an important study, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) propose an alternative de facto classi￿cation of
the exchange rate regime that utilises information on currency reserves in addition to the nominal exchange rate.
However, this index is available for fewer countries than the Reinhart-Rogo⁄ classi￿cation.
19policies.
A potential problem with these results is that the instruments for XRATE may be ine⁄ective
given that it is a discrete variable. In column 4 we use the XRATE information in a di⁄erent
way. We restrict the sample to those observations for which XRATE is de￿ned as a peg or a peg
with bands that stretch 2% either side of the target. The openness term retains its signi￿cance
in this sample of ￿xed and semi-￿xed exchange rates. This ￿nding provides some evidence
against the hypothesis that our results arise only because increased openness happens to have
been associated with a reduction in in￿ ation volatility arising from reduced pass-through from
exchange rates to consumer prices. As changes in pass-through are unlikely to have been an
important driver of in￿ ation volatility in cases in which exchange rate ￿ uctuations have been
minimal the relationship between openness and in￿ ation volatility is hard to interpret as the
result of failure to control for changes in pass-through.
In columns 5 ￿ 8 we side-step the issue of how to instrument the exchange rate regime by
reporting within groups estimates. The results in column 5 indicate a much stronger positive
e⁄ect of the exchange rate regime in this case (compare the results with those in column 1).
However, this relationship disappears on controlling for mean in￿ ation. In columns 7 and 8 the
evidence for a U-shaped e⁄ect of XRATE remains weak. In contrast, the e⁄ect of openness on
in￿ ation volatility is quite robust in all cases.
4.3 Robustness across sub-samples
Table 6 presents results for various sub-samples. In column 1 we exclude the 5% most extreme
values for in￿ ation volatility and openness (2:5% from each tail of each unconditional distribu-
tion). This means that Hong Kong and Singapore are omitted from the sample, an important
robustness check given that trade ratios may overstate the openness of these countries because
many imports are almost immediately exported. The e⁄ect of openness is robust.
In column 2 we exclude the 38 countries that are not awarded at least a grade C for data
quality by Summers and Heston (1988). Openness is signi￿cant at the 5% level, suggesting
that our basic ￿ndings are not due to low data quality in closed economies inducing spurious
volatility.
20The next sub-sample comprises the 68 low debt countries listed in Terra (1998). Terra argues
that the negative relationship between the levels of openness and in￿ ation exists only amongst
heavily indebted countries; here we investigate whether the same is true of openness and in￿ ation
volatility. Openness is signi￿cant at the 5% level and its coe¢ cient is of similar magnitude to
those obtained in Table 3.
In column 4 we omit the 20 countries that maintained an in￿ ation targeting regime during
some part of the sample (dates are taken from Fatas, Mihov and Rose 2004).31 The openness
e⁄ect is robust, suggesting that our main results are not due to in￿ ation targeting schemes having
caused a reduction in in￿ ation volatility and such changes being correlated with openness by
chance.
The next hypothesis that we address is that our results arise because structural adjustment
programmes associated with IMF/World Bank loans secure both macroeconomic stability and
trade openness. In column 5 we exclude 18 countries identi￿ed by Easterly (2005) as being
amongst the top 20 recipients of IMF and World Bank loans (the other two countries, Bangladesh
and Mali, are not part of our sample). The negative e⁄ect of openness remains intact, suggesting
that our results do not depend on the e⁄ects of IMF/World Bank interventions.
Column 6 focuses on 71 developing and emerging market economies.32 The e⁄ect of openness
is larger and more signi￿cant in the developing country sample than in the full sample. The
opposite is true in column 7, which looks only at the 23 OECD countries excluded from the
column 6 sample (￿RGDPt￿1 is added to the instruments used in column 7 because initial
results indicated very imprecise estimation). These results may arise because there exist reasons
to pursue in￿ ation stability in OECD countries even in the absence of openness, e.g. Posen (1993)
emphasises the importance of ￿nancial sector opposition to in￿ ation in industrial countries.
Similarly, consumption and production in OECD countries may have been concentrated in high
value added sectors at the start of the sample, in which case greater trade openness may be less
31Two countries, South Africa and Thailand, adopted in￿ ation targeting during 2000, the ￿nal year of the
sample. As a reform occurring in this year is unlikely to a⁄ect our results we do not exclude these countries.
32These are the 96 countries in the core sample minus 23 countries that have been OECD members since 1961.
Turkey has been an OECD member since 1961, but we include Turkey in the 71 country sub-sample on the
grounds that it is best regarded as an emerging market economy. Hong Kong and Singapore are excluded even
though they are not OECD members (including these two countries does not change the results).
21likely to reduce in￿ ation volatility by promoting structural change in this direction.
4.4 Robustness to varying the data frequency
In Table 6 we consider the sensitivity of our results to changing the data frequency. Column
1 uses a measure of in￿ ation volatility based on 5 year windows but calculated from annual
rather than quarterly data. Although quarterly data provide more observations for calculating
volatility, they may be subject to larger measurement errors than the annual data. The e⁄ect of
openness in column 1 is similar to that obtained for equivalent speci￿cations based on quarterly
data, however, suggesting that possible measurement errors in quarterly data do not drive our
results.
The second column of Table 6 measures in￿ ation volatility using quarterly data and 8 year
windows (1961￿68, 1969￿76 and so on) whilst the third column uses 3 year windows (1961￿63,
1964￿66 and so on). If the 5 year window is too short, in that shocks to in￿ ation are not given
time to dissipate, volatility may be understated because a shock with long-lived e⁄ects would
be recorded as a shift in the mean and limited variation around that mean, not high variation
around a stable mean. On the other hand, if shocks dissipate quickly but there are regular shifts
in mean in￿ ation, 5 year windows may span these breaks, leading to spurious volatility. The
results for alternative window lengths show that the e⁄ect of openness is preserved and in each
case the relationship is more signi￿cant than that obtained using 5 year windows (the puzzling
AR(1) outcome in column 2 may re￿ ect low test power in the small sample associated with 8
year windows).
5 Channels linking openness and in￿ ation volatility
In this section we explore channels through which openness may decrease in￿ ation volatility. The
￿rst idea that we discussed in section 2 was that openness increases the costs of in￿ ation volatility
and therefore provides an incentive for governments to restrict policies that induce volatility in
money supply growth and in￿ ation, e.g. recourse to seigniorage during periods of ￿scal de￿cit.
In order to investigate this hypothesis we augment the in￿ ation volatility regressions with a
measure of monetary volatility, calculated as the log of one plus the standard deviation of the
22annual growth rate of money plus quasi-money (V MON).33 If greater monetary stability is
one of the channels through which openness lowers in￿ ation volatility then on holding constant
V MON the e⁄ect of openness should diminish. The results are based on GMM-SYS estimation
in order to deal with potential reverse causation from in￿ ation volatility to monetary volatility
and are reported in Table 7. A constant sample of 344 observations (the largest common sample
for these variables) is used throughout. The ￿rst regression demonstrates that the e⁄ect of
openness is similar to that estimated previously. Column 2 adds V MON. The new term is
signi￿cant at the 5% level while the coe¢ cient multiplying openness is reduced by one third and
is insigni￿cant at the 10% level. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that openness
induces greater stability in in￿ ation through restricting the volatility of money supply growth.
A second channel through which openness can reduce in￿ ation volatility is promoting struc-
tural change in consumption and production, towards high value added goods for which world
prices (and hence the terms of trade) are more stable. In column 3 we explore this hypothesis
by adding to the baseline regression the term V TOT, de￿ned as the log of one plus the standard
deviation of the annual growth rate of the export price de￿ ator relative to the import price
de￿ ator.34 The V TOT term is signi￿cant and its inclusion reduces the openness coe¢ cient by
more than one half, such that it is insigni￿cant at the 25% level. This evidence is consistent with
the hypothesis that openness decreases in￿ ation volatility through inducing greater stability in
import prices and export prices, possibly through shifting trade towards high value added goods
via the mechanisms discussed in section 2.
In column 4 both V MON and V TOT are included in the model. Monetary volatility is
signi￿cant at the 10% level and terms of trade volatility at the 5% level, while the openness
coe¢ cient is only a little more than one third its size in column 1.35 These results suggest that
both channels are relevant in explaining the negative impact of openness on in￿ ation volatility.
In columns 5￿8 we replicate regressions 1￿4 but include domestic output volatility as a further
control. If anything, the roles of monetary and terms of trade volatility in accounting for the
33Underlying data are annual.
34Underlying data are annual.
35If these regressions are extended to include the average growth rate of the money supply and the average
growth rate of the terms of trade the conclusions drawn concerning the relationship between openness and in￿ ation
volatility become stronger.
23relationship between openness and in￿ ation volatility are more powerful in this case.
In order to further investigate the monetary volatility and terms of trade volatility channels
we present models for the determinants of these two intermediate variables in Table 8. In column
1 we report a GMM-SYS estimate of a regression in which monetary volatility depends on its
own lagged value and openness. Monetary volatility decreases with openness and this ￿nding
survives the inclusion of additional controls in column 2, including the average growth rate of
the money supply (MON).
A more precise test of the hypothesis that openness reduces monetary and in￿ ation volatility
through reducing the propensity for governments to use seigniorage during periods of ￿scal stress
is presented in column 3. The term V SEIGN is the log of one plus the decimal standard
deviation of the percentage growth rate of reserve money. This is the narrow measure of the
money supply that governments vary in order to raise seigniorage and is frequently used as a
basis for measuring seigniorage in empirical work, see for example Aisen and Veiga (2005a). The
volatility of the percentage growth rate of reserve money depends negatively on openness in a
parsimonious speci￿cation in which the controls are the average growth rate of reserve money
(SEIGN) and the ￿rst lag of V SEIGN. Furthermore, the e⁄ect is signi￿cant at the 1% level.
In column 4 the addition of other controls weakens this relationship but it remains signi￿cant at
the 10% level. Hence, the evidence suggests that trade openness reduces the volatility of reserve
money growth, possibly because governments in relatively open economies use seigniorage less
frequently in smoothing revenues. This then restricts the volatility of the aggregate money
supply, which in turn restricts the volatility of in￿ ation.
We also tried augmenting the baseline in￿ ation volatility regressions with the volatility of
reserve money growth, V SEIGN, i.e. an exercise analogous to those performed for V MON and
V TOT and reported in Table 7. As expected, this reduced the size of the openness coe¢ cient
such that it was insigni￿cant at the 5% level. However, the V SEIGN term, though positive,
was also insigni￿cant at conventional levels. This indicates that the link between the volatility
of narrow money and the volatility of in￿ ation is less strong than the link between the volatility
of broad money growth (V MON) and the volatility of in￿ ation. However, we also found that
V SEIGN exerts a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on V MON in GMM-SYS regressions. This
24suggests that the mechanism through which openness reduces in￿ ation volatility is through ￿rst
decreasing the volatility of reserve money growth. This restricts the volatility of broad money
growth, which then restricts the volatility of in￿ ation.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 8 we present models for the volatility of the growth rate of the
terms of trade. The OPEN term is negatively signed and signi￿cant even after controlling for
the average growth rate of the terms of trade, TOT. A caveat to note is that whilst openness
appears to reduce the average size of terms of trade shocks it may cause domestic in￿ ation to
be more sensitive to those shocks. The overall e⁄ect of openness occurring via the terms of
trade channel would then be ambiguous. The fact that the addition of V TOT to the in￿ ation
volatility regressions in Table 7 reduced the size of the OPEN coe¢ cient suggests that the role
of openness in restricting terms of trade volatility dominates any positive e⁄ect arising from
increased exposure to shocks.
Overall, whilst the evidence presented here cannot prove that openness reduces in￿ ation
volatility through restricting monetary volatility or through changing the structure of consump-
tion and production in favour of goods whose prices are more stable, the results are at least
consistent with those hypotheses.
6 Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the evidence linking trade openness and in￿ ation volatility.
The econometric approach used pre-determined variables as instruments in order to identify the
exogenous variation in openness. The principal ￿nding was that countries that have opened up
to trade more rapidly than the global average have experienced larger reductions in in￿ ation
volatility. The relationship is consistently signi￿cant at the 5% level, although in the most
general regressions that we consider the quantitative importance of the relationship is quite
modest, for instance a one standard deviation increase in openness implies only a 0:13 standard
deviation reduction in in￿ ation volatility. However, this is a lower bound on the magnitude of
the relationship given that openness may in￿ uence many of the controls that we considered, e.g.
the average rate of in￿ ation and per capita income.
We found that openness reduces in￿ ation volatility amongst ￿xed exchange rate and ￿ ex-
25ible exchange rate countries, suggesting that our results are unlikely the by-product of open
economies choosing ￿xed exchange rates and ￿xed rates delivering in￿ ation stability. Sub-sample
regressions were used to cast doubt on scenarios in which our results are induced by outliers,
poor data quality, the experiences of heavily indebted countries, the adoption of in￿ ation tar-
geting and IMF or World Bank interventions. Finally, we demonstrated that the negative e⁄ect
of openness on in￿ ation volatility is robust to measuring volatility over di⁄erent time intervals.
An important theme of the paper has been the need to pin down channels linking openness
and in￿ ation volatility. Two possibilities were emphasised. Firstly, if governments and cen-
tral banks believe that in￿ ation volatility is especially costly in open economies, e.g. because
it undermines the competitiveness of ￿rms in the tradables sector, they are less likely to re-
sort to seigniorage during periods in which revenues from conventional sources of taxation are
temporarily reduced. This will then restrict the volatility of broad money growth and hence
in￿ ation. Secondly, openness may change the structure of consumption and production, towards
goods whose prices are more stable internationally. This decreases terms of trade volatility and
therefore in￿ ation volatility. Our results showed a weaker link between openness and in￿ ation
volatility on holding constant monetary and terms of trade volatility, a ￿nding that is consistent
with these two arguments. In combination, the two channels appear to dominate any positive
e⁄ect of openness on in￿ ation volatility arising from greater exposure to global shocks. The fact
that these two channels are likely to be stronger in developing countries than industrial countries
provides one explanation for the absence of a clear relationship between openness and in￿ ation
volatility amongst OECD countries.
Our ￿ndings cast interesting new light on the relationship between openness and macro-
economic volatility. In particular, the impact of stronger trading links on nominal forms of
macroeconomic volatility such as in￿ ation appears much stronger than its impact on the volatil-
ity of real variables such as output growth. An important challenge for future research will
be to explore these di⁄erences in greater detail and to develop explanations for them based on
observable country characteristics.
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31Appendix A: Countries included in Table 2 regressions
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cost Rica, Cyprus, De-
mocratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lesotho Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papa New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portu-
gal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suri-
nam, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey,
Uganda, Uruguay, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
The following 12 countries drop out of the sample used in Table 3 due to data for some
of the controls being unavailable for those countries: Belgium, Fiji, Iceland, Liberia, Lesotho,
Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Sudan, Singapore, Surinam, Swaziland.
Appendix B: Data sources
V INF;INF: International Financial Statistics, line 64
OPEN, POP and RGDP: Penn World Tables, version 6.1 (October 2002)
PRIMEXP: World Bank
V OL: Calculated from RGDP, see above for source
TPV OL: IMF￿ s Direction of Trade Statistics database
BMP: World Bank
GROWTH: Calculated from RGDP, see above for source
XRATE: Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2004)
V MON,V TOT,GOV ,FDI,CAPFLOWS,AGRI,MANUF: World Development Indicators
PRIV Y : Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999)
PCI: Henisz (2000)
CLIMV OL: Earth Institute, Columbia University
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F IGURE 1: S CATTER P LOTS FOR O PENNESS ( X- AXIS)  AND I NFLATION V OLATILITY ( Y- AXIS) 
 
 























Notes: Inflation volatility (VINF) is the log of one plus the decimal standard deviation of quarterly observations on the annual inflation rate. Openness (OPEN) is the log of 
exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. The left-hand side graphs plots the 538 observations used to fit column 4 of Table 2. The right-hand side graph is the same except 
that the three largest readings for inflation volatility are omitted.   34
 
T ABLE 1: I NFLATION V OLATILITY AND O PENNESS,  1971-2000 
 
Inflation Volatility 
N  1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 
All  51 6.383  4.428  5.103  5.932  6.0258  3.737 
Developing  26  7.866  5.928  7.284 10.113  10.292 6.360 

















          
Sub-Saharan Africa  6  7.609  6.625  8.867 15.145  16.106 6.982 
Latin America & Caribbean  13  8.170  6.338  7.456 11.365  11.621 8.072 
South Asia  3  8.514 6.292 4.237 3.270 2.663 3.991 
Middle East & North Africa  5  6.210 4.372 3.820 2.985 2.931 1.929 
East Asia & Pacific  6  7.132 2.894 5.302 2.626 1.617 1.439 
W. Europe & N. America  18  4.127 2.532 2.583 1.302 1.514 0.750 
Trade Openness          
All  51  60.008 69.389 69.319 69.230 74.558 73.497 
Developing  26  48.304 57.041 52.300 54.560 64.727 68.390 

















          
Sub-Saharan Africa  6  50.079 56.049 47.777 47.755 57.753 58.737 
Latin America & Caribbean  13  50.138 59.228 52.272 56.778 65.157 67.067 
South Asia  3  30.0407  39.376 38.954 37.294 44.443 47.382 
Middle East & North Africa  5  66.069 76.911 77.684 76.970 83.871 79.457 
East Asia & Pacific  6 82.875  105.662 109.219 110.306 118.645  85.140 
W. Europe & N. America  18  65.850 72.149 78.774 75.194 74.685 82.523 
 
Notes: 
Inflation volatility is the standard deviation of annual percentage inflation at the quarterly frequency 
Regions defined on the basis of World Bank classifications. 
a.  Based on the World Bank classification of fuel and non-fuel primary exporters. Major exports 
are those that account for 50 percent or more of total exports of goods and services from one 
category in the period  1988-92 (non-fuel primary exports: SITC 0, 1, 2, 4 and 68; fuel exports: 
SITC3) 
b.  The low income group is a sub-set of the developing country group and is based on World 
Bank classifications 
 
Trade openness is exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP   35
T ABLE 2: B ASIC R ESULTS 
 
  D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  Inflation volatility (VINF) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
    OLS WG  GMM  System  System  System   


























POP          -.001 
(0.09) 
 
            
  D IAGNOSTIC TESTS ( P - VALUE)  
SERIAL CORR. TESTS            
   First-Order    0.632 0.113 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.005   
  Second-Order    0.196 0.017 0.762 0.658 0.579 0.826   
Sargan    -  -  0.547 0.348 0.403 0.336   
Difference-Sargan statistics for column (4): VINF(0.20) OPEN(0.76) POP(0.34) 
NT    538 538 442 538 538 512   
  I NSTRUMENTS 
 
VINF(t-2)  OPEN (t-2)  POP(t-2, t-3) 
Instruments for level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1)  ∆POP(t-2) 
 
Notes: 
Estimates are based on a sample of 96 countries, with at least 3 time observations available for each country. 
Period dummies are included in all specifications (but are not reported) and are also part of the instrument set. 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-statistics based on robust standard errors. 
 
OLS denotes ordinary least squares, WG denotes within groups, GMM denotes 1-step generalised method of 
moments estimation of the first differenced equation and System denotes 1-step joint generalised method of 
moments estimation of the first differenced and levels equations.  
 
The Sargan and Difference-Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions are based on 2-step GMM estimates in 
order to correct for heteroscedasticity and are asymptotically distributed as χ2(n−p), where n is the number of 
moment conditions and p is the number of parameters. The serial correlation tests are asymptotically distributed 



















 T ABLE 3: A DDITIONAL C ONTROLS  
  D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  Inflation volatility (VINF) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 


























































RGDP     -.003 
(0.47) 
          .003 
(0.28) 
RGDP*POP       -.004 
(0.67) 
         .003 
(0.29) 
PRIMARY*OPEN         .007 
(0.97) 
      .010 
(0.89) 
VOL           .304 
(1.13) 
     .052 
(0.23) 
TPVOL             2.498 
(2.03) 
   1.435 
(1.38) 








  D IAGNOSTIC TESTS ( P - VALUE) 
SERIAL CORR. TESTS                
   First-Order  0.002  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.004  0.001  .003  .004 
  Second-Order  0.765  0.364 0.350 0.355 0.351 0.228  0.299  0.393  .129  .107 
Sargan  0.174  0.248 0.245 0.387 0.246 0.537  0.161  0.187  .306  .827 
Diff-Sargan       0.91  0.52  0.75  0.66  0.82  0.20  0.20  .319   
NT  451  451 451 451 451 451  451  451  451 451 
See notes to Table 2. The instruments in column 1 are as in Table 2 except that in the first half of the system OPEN(t-2, t-3) is used. In columns 2-10 the additional instrument is 
the marginal regressor at t-2, except for the variables INF and GROWTH for which t-3 is used. Also, ∆INF(t-2) is used to instrument the levels equations in columns that control 
for INF. Column 6 uses ∆VOL(t-2) as an instrument in the second half of the system. Diff-Sargan tests the validity of moment conditions based on the marginal instruments.  37
 
T ABLE 4: T HE R OLE OF THE E XCHANGE R ATE R EGIME 
 
  D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  Inflation volatility (VINF) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
  System System  System  System  WG  WG  WG  WG 




























































XRATE squared   .008 
(0.70) 




             
  D IAGNOSTIC T ESTS (p-value) 
SERIAL CORR. TESTS         
   First-Order  0.004  0.005 0.002 0.004 0.065 0.016 0.065 0.018 
  Second-Order  0.597  0.629 0.277 0.301 0.051 0.000 0.053 0.000 
Sargan 0.232  0.196  0.468  0.664  -  -  -  - 
Diff-Sargan  0.580  0.570  - - - - - - 
NT  456  456 456 286 456 456 456 456 
  I NSTRUMENTS 
 
VINF(t-2)   OPEN (t-2)  POP(t-2, t-3) INF(t-3) XRATE(t-2) 
Instruments for level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1)  ∆POP(t-2) ∆INF(t-2) XRATE(t-1) 
 
See notes to Table 2. 
Diff-Sargan tests the validity of the moment conditions based on XRATE. Columns (1) and (2) exclude the 
instruments for INF, since INF is not included in the explanatory variables in those regressions. Column (4) 
excludes the XRATE instruments because XRATE is not included in the explanatory variables in that regression. 
   38
 
T ABLE 5: S UB- SAMPLE A NALYSIS 
  D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  Inflation volatility (VINF) 
  System GMM Estimates 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 























































                
  D IAGNOSTIC T ESTS (p-value) 
SERIAL CORR. TESTS                
   First-Order   0.000  0.086  0.007  0.001  0.002  0.000 0.074 
  Second-Order   0.568  0.227  0.907  0.265  0.792  0.271 0.612 
Sargan   0.483  0.324  0.161  0.678  0.572  0.794  1.000 
NT   478  353 402  413  452  376  154 
 
Instruments VINF(t-2)   OPEN (t-2, t-3)  POP(t-2, t-3)  INF(t-3) 
Instruments for level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1)  ∆POP(t-2)  ∆INF (t-2)   
See notes to Table 2. The instrument set varies slightly. Col (2) omits OPEN(t-2) and ∆POP (t-2). Col (6) omits 































   39
T ABLE 6: V ARYING THE D ATA F REQUENCY  
D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  Inflation volatility (VINF) 
System GMM Estimates 
    (1) (2) (3)   
    Measure volatility 
using annual data 
Quarterly data and 
eight year windows 
Quarterly data and 
three year windows 
 























    D IAGNOSTIC T ESTS (p-value) 
SERIAL CORR. TESTS          
   First-Order   0.002  0.724  0.069   
  Second-Order   0.213  0.800  0.690   
Sargan    0.546 0.549 0.576   
NT    538  272 967   
  Instruments VINF(t-2)  OPEN (t-2, t-3)  POP(t-2, t-3)  INF(t-3) 
Instruments for level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1)  ∆POP(t-2)  ∆INF(t-2) 
   
See notes to Table 2. Column (1) excludes ∆POP (t-2) from the instrument set.    40
 
T ABLE 7: P ROBING D EEPER FOR P OSSIBLE C HANNELS  
 
  D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  Inflation volatility (VINF) 
  System GMM Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
















































































             
  D IAGNOSTIC T ESTS (p-value) 
SERIAL CORR. TESTS         
  First-Order  0.001  0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 Second-Order  0.708  0.562 0.835 0.677 0.369 0.493 0.641 0.626 
Sargan  0.546  0.964 0.694 0.990 0.739 0.985 0.856 0.999 
Diff-Sargan  -  1.00  0.76  - - - - - 
NT  344  344 344 344 344 344 344 344 
  I NSTRUMENTS 
 
VINF(t-2 t-4) OPEN(t-2) POP(t-2, t-4) INF(t-3 t-4) VMON(t-2, t-4) VTOT(t-2) VOL(t-2) 
For level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1)  ∆POP(t-2) ∆INF(t-2) ∆VMON (t-1) ∆VTOT(t-1) 
See notes to Table 2. 
Instruments for mean inflation, monetary volatility, terms of trade volatility and output volatility are used only 
in equations in which those terms are included in the regressors.   41
T ABLE 8: A  C LOSER L OOK AT THE I NTERMEDIATE C HANNELS 
 
  D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  VMON, VSEIGN, VTOT 
  System GMM Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)     

















     
 
  









    
 
 
MON   .422 
(3.95) 
     
 
  























































  D IAGNOSTIC T ESTS (p-value) 
SERIAL CORR. TESTS              
  First-Order  0.008 0.002 0.014 0.001 0.000  0.000     
 Second-Order  0.450 0.324 0.205 0.163 0.524  0.409     
Sargan  0.735 0.890 0.095 0.806 0.203  0.749     
NT  376 326 430 430 466  421     
  I NSTRUMENTS 
 
VMON(t-2,t-3) VTOT(t-2,t-3)  OPEN (t-2,t-3)  POP(t-2, t-3) VSEIGN(t-2,t -3) 
For level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1)  ∆POP(t-2)  ∆VMON(t-1)  ∆VTOT(t-1) 
See notes to Table 2. 
Columns (2), (4) and (6) use the second lags of each of the extra variables included in those equations as 









     Special appendix for referees (not part of the paper submitted for publication) 
        In this special appendix we first consider alternative measures of inflation 
volatility and openness. In column 1 of Table A1 we estimate the full sample 
regression using ln(sd(inf)) as the dependent variable, where inf is a number such as 
3 (in the main text the dependent variable is ln(1+sd(inf/100)). The sample falls to 
530 because the INF term in this regression is ln(mean(inf)), which is undefined in 
the 8 instances in which mean inflation is negative. The coefficient multiplying 
openness is much larger than in comparable specifications from the main text due to 
the change in the units for the dependent variable, but the statistical significance of 
the estimate is robust. 
    In column (2) we measure inflation volatility as sd(ln(1+inf/100)). This measure 
is the volatility of a log rather than the log of a volatility and is intended to address 
the possibility that the standard deviation is a poor measure of volatility when there 
are blips in the inflation rate. Applying the log transform before taking the standard 
deviation down-weights these outliers before they are squared and therefore reduces 
their effect on the dependent variable. The absolute openness coefficient is quite 
small, reflecting the down-weighting of extreme observations, but is also more 
precisely estimated and is significant at the 5% level. 
    In column (3) the dependent variable is that used in the main text but OPEN is 
measured as the log import share in GDP. This is the measure of openness used by 
Romer (1993). The results are slightly weaker using this measure of openness, 
suggesting that the size of the export sector is relevant in determining inflation 
volatility. Nevertheless, the effect is significant at the 5% level. 
 
    Results from static regressions 
    In Table A2 we reproduce the regressions featuring additional controls (columns 3-
10 of Table 3) except that the lagged dependent variable is excluded on the grounds 
that it was insignificant in all columns in Table 3 that included mean inflation. The 
results confirm that the relationship between openness and mean inflation is robust 
to using static rather than dynamic GMM-SYS models (note that GMM-SYS is an 
efficient and consistent estimator for static as well as dynamic panel models and has 
often been used in the static context, see for example Beck 2002).     Results using additional controls 
    We now report models incorporating additional controls. As some of the variables 
are observed only from the mid-1970s, or for a subset of countries, maintaining a 
constant sample across the columns of Table A3 would mean discarding a large 
amount of information in some cases and therefore we allow the sample to fluctuate. 
Column 1 adds the log ratio of private credit to GDP (PRIVY). This is interpreted 
as a proxy for financial development, which may reduce volatility through allowing 
agents to smooth expenditures following income shocks. Financial depth is 
insignificant while openness is significant at the 10% level but has a smaller 
coefficient than in Table 2. 
        Columns 2 and 3 address the role of financial openness in setting inflation 
volatility by controlling for the log of one plus gross foreign direct investment as a 
decimal fraction of GDP (FDI) and the log ratio of private capital flows to GDP 
(CAPFLOWS) respectively. In both cases the proxies for financial openness are 
insignificant. This is consistent with the potentially ambiguous effect of financial 
openness on volatility - recall that Aghion et al (2004) show that foreign investments 
can be pro-cyclical and therefore amplify volatility, rather than restrict it through 
compensating for the absence of well functioning domestic credit markets. In 
contrast, the role of trade openness remains intact. 
    In column 4 we control for the political constraints index (PCI) derived by Henisz 
(2000), which is inversely related to the ability of individual actors to bring about a 
change in government policy, and in column 5 we control for the log ratio of 
government spending to GDP (GOV). Political constraints may reduce inflation 
volatility through restricting discretionary policy interventions (Satyanath and 
Subramanian (2004) show that political constraints, and broader measures of 
democracy, reduce nominal macroeconomic volatility). Large governments may 
stabilise economic activity if state spending less taxation is counter-cyclical, see Fatas 
and Mihov (2001) for some supporting evidence. In both cases the role of openness in 
restricting inflation volatility is unaltered, while the additional controls are 
insignificant. Column 6 controls for the log of one plus an index of climatic volatility 
(CLIMVOL) defined as the root mean square of monthly precipitation anomalies, and calculated by the Earth Institute at Columbia University. The role of openness is 
robust to controlling for this measure of climatic shocks. 
    Finally, columns 7 and 8 control for the log share of agriculture in GDP (AGRI) 
and the log share of manufacturing in GDP (MANUF). A hypothesis of interest here 
is that state lead industrialisation programmes may drive expansion in the 
manufacturing sector and thereby account for reduced inflation volatility in 
developing countries. It is important to demonstrate that the role of openness is 
robust to this effect. On the other hand, it should be noted that we argued that one 
channel through which openness may reduce inflation volatility is that manufacturing 
exports increase; as this sector provides a more stable source of income than 
traditional export industries in developing countries, inflation volatility will fall. 
Hence, the estimated effect of openness when holding constant the manufacturing 
share must reflect channels other than that based on export structures, e.g. a change 
in the composition of exports or the adoption of more disciplined monetary policy. 
The column 8 results show that openness remains significant after controlling for the 
manufacturing share, indicating that the import structure and monetary stability 
channels are sufficient to induce a negative relationship between openness and 
inflation volatility. The MANUF term is negatively signed, supporting the view that 
expansion in high value added sectors reduces inflation volatility, though its 












 T ABLE A1: A LTERNATIVE M EASURES OF O PEN AND V INF 
 
D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  Inflation volatility (VINF) 
System GMM Estimates 
    (1) (2) (3)   
    Dependent variable is 
ln sd(100inf) 
Dependent variable 
is sd(ln (1+inf)) 
Openness is the 
import share in GDP 
 























    D IAGNOSTIC T ESTS (p-value) 
SERIAL CORR. TESTS          
   First-Order   0.000  0.000  0.000   
  Second-Order   0.290  0.387  0.219   
Sargan    0.177 0.360 0.386   
NT    530  538 538   
   I NSTRUMENTS 
  VINF(t-2)  OPEN (t-2, t-3)  POP(t-2, t-3)  INF(t-3) 
For level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1)  ∆POP(t-2)  ∆INF(t-2) 
   
See notes to Table 2. T ABLE A2: S TATIC V ERSIONS OF THE M ODELS WITH 
A DDITIONAL C ONTROLS 
 
  D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  Inflation volatility (VINF) 
  System GMM Estimates 

























































      .003 
(0.28) 






     .010 
(0.88) 






   .007 
(0.03) 




   1.384 
(1.38) 














  D IAGNOSTIC T ESTS (p-value) 
SERIAL CORR. TESTS          
   First-Order  0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.002 
  Second-Order  0.353 0.358  0.365  0.236  0.303  0.387  0.141  0.103 
Sargan 0.254  0.408  0.251  0.248  0.225  0.152  0.375  0.786 
NT  451 451 451  451  451  451  451  451 
  I NSTRUMENTS 
 
OPEN (t-2,t-3)  POP(t-2,t-3)  INF(t-3) 
For level equations : ∆OPEN(t-1)  ∆POP(t-2)  ∆INF(t-2) 
See notes to Table 2. 
Each column uses the second lag of the additional regressor included in that equation as an instrument for the first 
differenced equation, except in the case of the GROWTH variable for which the third lag is used to ensure the 











 T ABLE A3: C ONTROLS NOT C ONSIDERED IN THE M AIN T EXT 
 
  D EPENDENT VARIABLE⎯  Inflation volatility (VINF) 
  System GMM Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 




















































       




      
 




   
 
PCI       .012 
(0.28) 
      
 






CLIM VOL         -.0829 
(0.66) 
  
AGRI          -.002 
(0.30) 
 
MANUF            -.045 
(1.16) 
  D IAGNOSTIC T ESTS (p-value) 
SERIAL CORR. TESTS         
   First-Order  0.001  0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 
  Second-Order  0.359  0.148 0.110 0.215 0.497 0.249 0.481 0.252 
Sargan  0.344  0.514 0.671 0.348 0.552 0.462 0.121 0.377 
Diff-Sargan  -  0.790 0.300 0.620 0.910 0.280 0.052 0.330 
NT  497  408 372 536 513 487 474 383 
  I NSTRUMENTS 
 
VINF(t-2)  OPEN (t-2,t-3)  POP(t-2,t-3)  INF(t-3) 
For level equations : ∆OPEN(t-1)  ∆POP(t-2)  ∆INF(t-2) 
See notes to Table 2. 
Each column uses the second lag of the additional regressor included in that equation as an instrument for the first 
differenced equation. Column (1) adds an extra lag of each variable to the instruments used for the first differenced 
equations and drops ∆POP(t-2) from the instruments for the levels equations. Column (7) uses the fourth lag of 
agriculture in the instruments because the second lag led to a rejection on the Difference-Sargan test. Column (8) 
omits ∆POP(t-2) from the instruments. 